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Abstract
We study frictionless matching models in large production economies.
We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for segregation and for pos-
itive assortative matching. These conditions focus on the relationship be-
tween what we call the segregation payoff — a generalization of the indi-
vidually rational payoff — and the feasible set for a pair of types. Our
approach is useful for clarifying differences in the behavior of models in the
literature. It also provides a basis for understanding the effects of changes in
technology or in the severity of market imperfections on equilibrium welfare
and matching patterns.
1. Introduction
There is a long tradition, dating back at least to Roy [17] and Tinbergen [23],
which views the distribution of earnings as an equilibrium outcome of a match-
ing problem.1 There has been a recent revival of interest in matching models,
partly because of their utility in studying the classical problem of income distri-
bution, but also because they provide a useful setting for examining problems as
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1Sattinger [18] provides a fine survey of the "classical" literature.
diverse as disease transmission, community formation, education financing, and
organizational design ([11], [2], [7], [13], [14]).
Among the main insights of the literature of the 60s was the prediction that in
the presence of complementarities there would be positive assortative matching,
i.e., that more able individuals are assigned to more productive tasks or to more
able individuals. An important consequence of this result is that the distribution
of payoffs will tend to be more skewed than that of the underlying distribution of
abilities. These classical insights were derived mainly for environments without
market imperfections. The work of Becker [1], Sattinger [19] and the recent work
by Kremer [10] and Kremer-Maskin [12] are in this line. By contrast, much
of the recent literature has been concerned by environments in which market
imperfections play a significant role (externalities such as human capital spillovers,
moral hazard in production, credit constraints). Unfortunately, though some of
the examples in this literature suggest that the equilibrium behavior of matching
models with imperfections may be very different from those without imperfections,
there seems to be a lack of characterization results that can help us distinguish
the various cases.2
Our goal in this paper is to help fill this gap. We study frictionless matching
models in large production economies without widespread externalities.3 We pro-
vide necessary and sufficient conditions for segregation and for positive assortative
matching. These conditions enable us to highlight some fundamental differences
in the comparative static behavior of some models in the literature and should be
particularly useful in the study of models with imperfections. Another goal of the
paper is to clarify the differing effects of changes in technology and changes in the
distribution of individual characteristics on the equilibrium welfare and matching
2
 For instance, Legros-Newman [13] study a model of firm formation and find that when
capital markets are perfect, matches are segregated, while when capital markets are imperfect,
there may be negative assortative matching. In the second case, the outcome depends on the
distribution of wealth.
3That is, all externalities can be internalized by finite coalitions. This means that the set
of payoffs that are feasible for a particular coalition does not depend on what other coalitions
exist or what they are doing; of course the equilibrium payoffs will depend on these factors,
in general. This restriction may exclude certain types of imperfections from the analysis (e.g.
community formation models such as [3] and [7] in which there are congestion effects), but we
believe our approach has some relevance to those cases.
patterns in worlds with and without market imperfections.4'5
Ideally, for doing comparative statics, we would like to characterize the equi-
librium matching map and the corresponding equilibrium utility map. In practice,
such a characterization is difficult. We show that a lot of information about the
comparative static properties of a model can be obtained by analyzing the changes
in the feasible utility set and what we call the segregation payoffs. The segregation
payoff for an individual is the equilibrium payoff to this individual in an economy
consisting solely of individuals of the same type as himself.
In order to provide a sense of the issues, consider the following model. There
is a production process in which two tasks, denoted 1 and 2, have to be simulta-
neously performed in order for a positive output to be realized. Workers differ in
their abilities, which are publicly observable and drawn from [a, a]. A worker can
work on one task only. If a worker of ability a\ is assigned to task 1 and a worker
of ability a2 is assigned to task 2, then the output is h (ai, a2); h is increasing in
both arguments and has a complementarity property (has positive cross partials).
Workers match and share their output. The matching process itself is assumed to
be frictionless; competitive equilibrium or the core are typical solution concepts.
This model has been applied widely.6 For instance, Becker [1] uses this as a
model of the marriage market. Individuals are distinguished on the basis of their
gender i = 1,2; men perform task 1, women perform task 2. It is well known
that the matching in this model is always positive assortative: if one man has
a higher ability than another man, his mate will have a higher ability than the
other man's mate. It can be shown that for a given distribution of abilities, the
equilibrium matching pattern is invariant to the choice of h as long as h has the
complementarity property.
Kremer [10] and Kremer and Maskin [12] also use this model to study in-
come distribution. The first paper uses h (0,1,(12) = a\a2 while the second uses
4
 Our results do not rely on optimization methods. In the case of models without imperfec-
tions, the latter may be helpful because equilibria are Pareto optimal and can be characterized
as the solutions to a planner's problem. But that approach does not seem to extend very well to
the case of models with imperfections because there is not generally a convenient optimization
problem which corresponds to the equilibrium.
5
 A recent paper by Cole, Mailath and Postlewaite [4] studies some properties of matching
models, but their focus is on models in which there is an investment stage before the match and
on whether the resulting equilibrium is efficient as the economy gets large.
6For instance, the models of Roth [16] (two-sided assignment models), Gale-Shapley [8],
Spurr [22] (match lawyers and claims), Roy [17], Sattinger [18] (match workers to tasks or to
sectors).
M a i , a 2) = a i a2- I n the first case there is perfect segregation: in equilibrium,
each firm consists of a single type of worker. In the second case, firms will not be
segregated; in particular, if the support of the distribution is small enough, the
best worker will match with the median worker and the others will match in a
positive assortative way. The change in the matching pattern can only have come
from the difference in the production function. As we know, this cannot happen
in Becker's model.
Why the dramatic difference in comparative statics? There is an important
distinction between the two models. In Becker's case, specialization in tasks is
exogenous; individuals cannot choose their gender. In Kremer-Maskin's case,
specialization in tasks is endogenous; individuals choose cooperatively after the
match on which task to work. This is reflected in the payoff function in the
following way. In both models, a worker's willingness to pay for a partner depends
on the difference between what he achieves with a partner and his segregation
payoff. In Becker's case, if two people of the same gender match together they
receive a payoff of zero irrespective of their abilities. Therefore the gains from a
heterogeneous match relative to the segregation payoffs are fully described by the
output function h. Every man would like to match with the ablest woman, but it
is the ablest man who is willing to pay the most. This fact is independent of the
specific form of h. By contrast, in Kremer-Maskin, the segregation payoff varies
with ability and with the choice of h. Therefore the individuals do not unanimously
rank the other individuals and the pattern of matching will be more complex and
more sensitive to the specifics of the technology and type distribution.
Our analysis follows a simple economic logic. One normally thinks of an equi-
librium as a situation in which individuals' current benefits exceed their outside
options. While it is sometimes the case that for some individuals the equilibrium
outside option is equal to the segregation payoff, this will not be true in general.
Nevertheless, we use the segregation payoff as a lower bound on the outside op-
tion and compare it to the utility possibility obtained in different matches. Doing
so we have a natural concept of "gains from trade" (more precisely gains from a
heterogeneous match). It is the comparative static of these gains from trade that
will tell us much about the equilibrium outcome. For example, it helps to indicate
situations in which individuals of very different types match together — possibly
inefficiently — simply because one type has a very low segregation payoff.
2. The Model
2.1. Notation
Throughout this paper, we will follow much of the literature in restricting atten-
tion to matches of size two. We will indicate which results generalize.
The set of individuals is the unit square / = [0,1] with Lebesgue measure A.
Individuals are assigned types by a map r : / —> T which assumes values in the
measurable lattice (T, 7~, ^ ) . We assume that for any x E [0,1] , r (i) is constant
for all i E {x} x [0,1] .7
For any coalition of individuals, the set of feasible payoffs is described by the
characteristic function V.s Since we are only considering matches of size two, it is
enough to specify V for sets of size two and of size one (this automatically rules
out "externalities" among coalitions). The feasible set of payoffs depends only on
the characteristics of the individuals in the coalition. Therefore, for any two indi-
viduals i and j such that r (z) = r (j), V (i) = V (j) and for any other individual
k <£ {i, j} , V (i,k) = V (j,k). We assume that V is closed, comprehensive and
bounded above.9 We will sometimes abuse notation and denote by V (t, t') the
characteristic function of two individuals with types t and t'.
Consider two individuals i and j of the same type t who are matched to-
gether. Since V is comprehensive and closed, there exists a payoff u (t) such
that {u (t) ,u (t)) is on the Pareto frontier of V (t,t). We call such a payoff the
segregation payoff of type t.
Figure 1
7In other words, all agents in a vertical segment of / have the same type. This does not
entail, of course, that there is a continuum of types. We construct the individual space in this
way in order to talk meaningfully of segregation.
8For instance, in the examples of the Introduction, two agents i and j of abilities a and
b have a feasible set V (i,j) = {(^1,^2) : vi +^2 5: Ma '^)} an(^ a n ag e n t * has a feasible set
V (i) = (—oo,0] independently of his ability.
9V is comprehensive if for any set P, v € V (P) implies that v' G V (P) whenever v[ < Vi
for all i G P. In economies with imperfect markets, for instance incentive problems, V may fail
to be comprehensive. This does not pose problem for the existence of equilibria but might be
incompatible with the existence of a segregation payoff for some types. This problem is easily
fixed as we discuss in the Appendix.
2.2. Equilibrium
Our focus in this paper is the way individuals are matched to each other, i.e., the
way the individuals partition themselves into coalitions. We use the core as the
equilibrium concept: a partition can be part of an equilibrium if there exists a
payoff structure that is feasible for that partition and such that it is not possible
for some individuals to obtain a higher payoff by forming a coalition different than
their equilibrium coalition.
For any v : I —>• R, for any subsets P of size one or two, we abuse notation
and denote by v (P) the vector (v (i) : i € P). We denote by P the set of measure
consistent partitions of / into subsets of size two at most.10 For a given map
v : / —» R we say that the partition V is minimal with respect to v if i ^ j and
{i,j} E V imply that (v (i), v (j)) (£ V (i) x V (j).
Definition 2.1. An equilibrium is a pair (V,v) such that V E P is minimal with
respect to v : / —>• R and such that
(i) For almost all P e V, v (P) e V (P ) .
(ii) For each finite coalition Q, and each v' G V (Q) , there exists i € Q such
that v' (i) <v(i).
Our assumptions guarantee that an equilibrium always exists (see Kaneko-
Wooders [9] and Wooders [24]; Scotchmer [20] discusses related solution concepts).
We first note that all equilibria are constrained Pareto efficient. Indeed, since
effective coalitions are finite, the grand coalition cannot achieve anything more
than what two person coalitions can achieve. If there were a Pareto improvement,
then the grand coalition could block the equilibrium payoff but then a two person
coalition could also do it and this would violate the definition of an equilibrium.
We now provide some definitions useful for characterizing equilibria.
Definition 2.2. An equilibrium (<P,f) satisSes segregation (SEG) if for almost
allP eV,r(i) =T (j) for all i,j e P.
10Let V be a partition of / . Let V2 be the set of elements of V of size two. List the elements
of every P £ "P2 according to the lexicographic order ^i^on ]R2 (hence, write P = (*, j) when
* ^1L j)- Let I1 be the set of agents who are first and / 2 the set of agents who are second. V
is measure consistent if A (71) = A (/2) . This restriction rules out partitions in which say, all
agents in [0,1/3] X [0,1] are matched one-to-one with all the agents in (1/3,1] x [0,1]. See also
Wooders [24] and Kaneko-Wooders [9].
Definition 2.3. An equilibrium (V,v) satisfies essential segregation (ESEG) if
there exists another equilibrium (V,v) satisfying SEG such that v = v almost
everywhere. An economy is segregated if all equilibria are essentially segregated.
Note that if an economy is segregated, the equilibrium payoff is essentially
unique: in equilibrium, almost every individual obtains the segregation payoff for
his type. For this reason, the segregation payoff provides a lower bound on the
outside option of an individual in any equilibrium match.
In partial equilibrium analyses (bargaining problems, principal-individual mod-
els), outside options are exogenously given and are crucial for predicting how gains
from cooperation will be allocated across the individuals. In our framework how-
ever, the outside option of an individual will usually be his equilibrium payoff.
There is therefore no obvious operational concept of outside option that can be
used if one wants to understand the structure of equilibria without having to
compute them. A theme of this paper is that the segregation payoff is actually
an operational concept of outside option: it tells us a lot about the patterns of
matching that can arise in equilibrium and from this computation of equilibrium
payoffs is greatly simplified.
Segregation is an extreme kind of equilibrium outcome. When the set of types
is unidimensional, the literature has used a weaker concept than segregation—the
so-called positive assortative matching—which generates a complete order on the
set of equilibrium coalitions. Indeed, start first by defining for a coalition (z, j),
the ordered vector p (z, j) = (r (z) V r (j) , r ( i ) A r (j))- Then, define for any two
equilibrium coalitions (i,j) and (k,l), the order corresponding to the natural
order on the vectors p (z, j) and p (k,l), i.e., (z, j) ^ (k,l) when p(i,j) > p(k,l).
Positive matching means that any two equilibrium coalitions can be ordered by
the order ^ .
In many applications, the restriction to one dimensional types is undesirable
(for instance, if wealth and ability both affect the outcome). A notion of positive
assortative matching is therefore needed when T has more than one dimension;
it is not immediately obvious how this should be defined. We propose a defini-
tion which seems to be the natural one, although, as we point out, it does not
necessarily generate a complete order on the set of equilibrium coalitions.11
11Shimer and Smith [21] propose a different definition of positive assortative matching which
requires that the set of matched pairs forms a lattice. This is more restrictive than our definition,
which may be an advantage, but it has the drawback that a given set of matched pairs would
be considered to be positively matched under certain type distributions but would not be under
Definition 2.4. An equilibrium (V, v) satisfies positive assortative matching (PAM)
if for any two equilibrium coalitions P = {i,j} and P' = {k, 1} , the following are
true:
T (f) V T (j) y r(h)V r (I) = ^ r (i) A r (j) £ r (k) A r (I)
T (i) A r (i) K ( f c ) A r ( I ) ^ r (i) V r (j) fc r (A;) V r (/).
A third type of matching is "negative assortative," defined analogously:
Definition 2.5. An equilibrium (V,v) satisfies negative assortative matching
(NAM) if for any two equilibrium coalitions P = {i,j} and P' = {k,l} , the
following are true:
r ( i ) V r (j) K ( I J ) V T ( H T (i) A r (j) ^ r (fc) A r (Z)
r (i) A r (j) K ( f c ) A r ( l ) ^ r (z) V r (j) ^r(k)Wr (I).
PAM generates an order on equilibrium coalitions. Formally, we define (i,j) ~
(A;, /) whenever r (I)\/T (j) ^ r (fc)Vr (I) and r (z) Ar (j) £3 r (k)Ar (I). Notice that
this definition relies on the order defined on the lattice. As an illustration, in the
Becker example, we should define the type space to be the lattice T = {1, 2} x [a, a]
with the lexicographic order, i.e., (i, a) >- (j, b) whenever i > j or whenever i = j
and a > b. Using the "natural " order on T would allow matches like that in Figure
2 below to be positive assortative while we know that these matches cannot be
part of an equilibrium, and more seriously, do not correspond to the intuitive
notion of positive assortative matching.
Figure 2
The order ^ on coalitions might fail to be complete. In Figure 3a below, the
type space is two dimensional with the natural order, i.e., a £3 b when a\ > b\ and
a2 > &2- With an abuse of notation, let {a,rf}and {6, c} be two coalitions. These
coalitions satisfy PAM since neither the joins nor the meets can be compared.
This shows that the order on coalitions induced by PAM is not complete.
Figure 3a and 3b
Notice first that the incompleteness of the order on coalitions stems from the
incompleteness of the order on the type space. Indeed, we have the following
result which we state without proof:
others.
Observation If the order on the lattice T is complete, then the order on coalitions
induced by PAM is complete.
Second, observe that in this example if one looks in only one dimension at
a time, the coalitions are ordered by the conventional definition of PAM. Unfor-
tunately this is not generally true as the example in Figure 3b shows. There,
coalitions (i,j) and (&,/) satisfy (trivially) the definition of PAM but they are
most assuredly not positively matched in either dimension. Observing positive
matching or negative matching in either dimension then does not necessarily re-
veal very much about the underlying economic process generating the match. For
instance, we can think of the two dimensions as height and agility and the indi-
viduals as basketball players. If what matters is some index of basketball talent
that is increasing in both quantities, then as Figure 3c shows, we could even get
segregation in basketball talent but negative matching on each dimension.
Definition 2.6. An equilibrium (V,v) satisfies essential positive assortative match-
ing (EPAM) if there exists an equilibrium [V,vj satisfying PAM, with v = v
almost everywhere. An economy is positively matched if all equilibria satisfy
EPAM.
2.3. Results
We will provide characterization results for segregated and positively matched
economies. They are expressed in terms of two conditions which depend only on
the characteristic function and are therefore relatively easy to verify.
Definition 2.7 (Condition S). Let
X = {(tj) eT2:3v eV(t,if), v > (u(t) ,u(t'))}.
Condition S is satisfied if X is empty.
X is the set of types for which there are gains from trade, meaning that it is
possible for individuals of those types to match and Pareto improve relative to
the segregation payoffs.
Figure 4
Going back to Becker, it is clear that u (t) = 0 for all t, where T = {1, 2} x
[a, a]. As long as h(-, • )> 0, X = I, and therefore condition S is not satisfied. In
Kremer [10], since h (a, b) = ab, u(a) = ^- and for any a ^ 6, h(a,b) < ^- + y .
Therefore X = 0 and condition S is satisfied. We know that the economy is
segregated in Kremer. In fact, we obtain the following general result.
Proposition 2.8. (i) An economy is segregated if Condition S is satisfied, (ii) If
Condition S is not satisfied, there is a type assignment r such that the economy
is not segregated.
Proof, (i) Suppose that Condition S holds and that there is an equilibrium which
violates ESEG. This means that a positive measure of agents are receiving more
than their segregation payoffs. For this to be true, there must be heterogeneous
matches of the form (t,t'). In such matches, at least one of the agents is getting
more than her segregation payoff; for stability, the other type must be getting
at least its segregation payoff. But then there must exist v £ V(t,t') such that
v > (u(t) ,u(t')), which contradicts Condition S.
(ii) Suppose that Condition S does not hold: there exists a pair of types (t, t')
and a v G V(t, t') such that v > (u (t) ,u(t')); clearly this is only possible if t ^ t'.
Take the type assignment which puts an atom of size 1/2 at t and an atom of size
1/2 at t'. There is an equilibrium in which almost every coalition is composed of
types (t, t') and the payoffs are given by v. These payoffs cannot be replicated by
segregation, hence the economy is not segregated.
•
The result says simply heterogeneous coalitions will form regardless of the type
distribution if and only if there are gains from trade relative to the segregation
payoffs. The same result is true for general matching problems as long as effective
coalitions are finite: one merely has to modify Condition S to say that there
is no finite set of heterogeneous types which can Pareto improve relative to the
corresponding segregation payoff vector.
Note that if we want all equilibria in an economy to satisfy SEG, we need the
segregation payoff vector of any heterogeneous coalition to be outside its feasible
set, i.e., that (u (t) ,u (t')) G V (t, t') implies t = t'. Note also that in an equilibrium
satisfying ESEG, it is not necessary that the members of heterogeneous coalitions
have the same segregation payoff. On the other hand, in [13] we have environments
in which the economy is segregated and in which equilibria that satisfy ESEG have
the property that individuals in equilibrium coalitions have the same segregation
payoff, and we conjecture that this is generically the case.
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An implication of the foregoing is that the analysis should be made on a
modified characteristic function that captures the notion of the potential gains
from "trade" (i.e., heterogeneous matching). For convenience, we will define this
new characteristic function on the type space. Formally, let S (£, t') — {0} U
{[V (hj) ~ (u(t) ,u(t'))} DR2+) and let S (t) = {0} U ([V (i) - u (t)\ n R+), for
any i e r"1 (t), j 6 r~x (t')}2 Note that S (t, t') = {0} when t = r (i), t' = T (j)
and (i,j) £ X, with X defined in Condition S. Hence, Condition S can then be
restated to say that the set {(t,f) : S (t,f) = {0}} has full measure.
We now provide a characterization of positive assortative matching.
By construction of the surplus set S, S (a, b) has relative dimension 2 whenever
there are gains from trade. Otherwise, S is the zero vector. Let Sp denote the
Pareto frontier of S and SD = S\SP denote the set of Pareto dominated elements
of S.13
Definition 2.9. Condition P is satisfied if for any four elements {a, 6, c, d} ofT,
where aVdybVc^bAcyaAd, and s 6 Sp (a,d) X Sp (6, c), one of the two
conditions below is true. Either
seS(a,b)x S(c,d) orseS(a,c) x S(b,d) (2.1)
or
3t e {a, d}, ie {b, c] such that (s (t), s (i)) G SD (t, i) (2.2)
Condition P says that for any negative match, either it is possible to "rematch"
the types in a positive way that keeps all four types (at least) indifferent (A), or
the match is not stable (B).
As for the case of segregation, we are looking for conditions on the charac-
teristic function which ensure positive matching regardless of the particular type
distribution.
Proposition 2.10. (i) An economy is positively matched if Condition P is sat-
isfied, (ii) If Condition P is not satisfied, there is a type assignment r such that
the economy is not positively matched.
12Therefore, if the segregation payoff vector lies outside the feasible set, we define the surplus
set to be {0}. The fact that the surplus is zero captures the idea that there are no gains from
trade.
13
 Hence, 5 p = { s G 5 : V s e 5 , - i [S » s]} . Note that if there are no gains from trade, SD = 0
since S = Sp = {0} .
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Proof, (i) Suppose that Condition P holds. If an economy is not positively
matched, there exist a, b, c, d where aV d >- 6 V c ^ b Ac >- a A d and payoffs s,
where s 6 Sp (a, d) x Sp (6, c) , 1 4 such that the matches (a, d) and (6, c) are part
of the equilibrium and it is not possible to obtain a positively matched reshuffling
of these types which keeps the payoffs the same (A is violated). Since there
are no beneficial deviations from the equilibrium payoffs s, (B) is also violated,
contradicting Condition P.
(ii) Suppose that Condition P is not satisfied. Since (A) is violated, s (£
S (a, b) x S(c: d) and s £ S (a, c) x S(b, d). Since (B) is violated, for each t € {a, d}
and each t E {b, c} , (s (£) , s (£)) ^ SD (t, t) . Consequently, it is not possible
to replicate the payoffs s by a positive match between a, b, c and d. Consider
r such that there are four atoms at a, b, c and d of equal mass. The matches
(a, d), (6, c) together with the payoff s constitute an equilibrium and the economy
is not positively matched. •
Proposition 2.10 shows that if the characteristic function satisfies certain prop-
erties, the equilibrium matching pattern will (essentially) always assume a positive
assortative form. But in economies in which this condition is violated, the out-
come will be sensitive to type assignment map: the equilibrium matching pattern
will depend on the distribution of types. We will illustrate this point in the Ap-
plications section below.
We now consider a special case that encompasses most of the complete market
examples already present in the literature (but which still allows for multidimen-
sional types). We say that the surplus is transferable if for any S, there exists a
such that the Pareto frontier Sp can be expressed as Sp = {s > 0 : Si + S2 — °~} -15
For the class of economies with transferable surplus, Condition P can be writ-
ten in a simpler way, as Condition PT below. While sufficiency of Condition PT
will be immediate, necessity is not, mainly because of the restriction that payoffs
must be nonnegative.
Definition 2.11. Condition PT is satisfied if for any four elements {a, b, c, d} of
T, where a V ( i ) - 6 V c ^ 5 A c ^ a A c i , either
a (a, d) + a (6, c) < a (a, c) + cr (6, d)
14If s fi Sp (a, d) X Sp (b, c), either (a, d) or (6, c) has an incentive to deviate from the proposed
payoffs.
15For instance, in the models of Becker and Kremer-Maskin, for each coalition of types (t,f),




a (a, d) + a" (6, c) < a (a, 6) 4- & (c, d) .
We observe that Condition PT implies Condition P. To see this, note that
if Condition P is not satisfied, there exist four elements {a, 6, c, d} of T, with
a\/dyb\/c^bAcyaAd, and s E Sp (a, d) x Sp (6, c), i.e.,
s(a) + s (d) = a(a, d) and 5 (6) + s (d) = a(b, d) (2.3)
such that (A) is not satisfied, i.e.,
V {t1)t2} = { 6 , c } , 3 £ € { a , d } , 3 i 6 { l , 2 } ( .
s(i)+s(U) >a(i,U) l ' ;
and such that (B) is not satisfied either, i.e.,
vte{M},£e{&,c} ,
a(t) + *(£)><r(M*). l
Therefore, by (2.3), (2.5)
V{t1,t2} = {6,c}, . .
ff(o)d) + ff(6,c)>ff(o,t1)+(7(dIt2). ' l ;
which is a violation of PT. Hence, Condition PT implies Condition P. In the
Appendix, we show the converse. Hence we have
Proposition 2.12. When the surplus is transferable: (i) An economy is posi-
tively matched if Condition PT is satisfied, (ii) If Condition PT is not satisfied,
there is a, type assignment r such that the economy is not positively matched.
For aVdybVc^bAcyaAd , Condition PT can also be written as
either a (a, c) — a (a, d) > a (b, c) — a (6, d) or a (a, b) — <j (a, d) > a (c, b) — a (c, d).
This condition resembles the familiar increasing difference (ID) condition dis-
cussed for instance in [15]: a satisfies ID if for all a y b and c >~ d, cr(a,c) —
a (a, d) > a (6, c) — a (b, d) In the one dimensional case however, Condition PT is
13
weaker since it requires comparison among four ordered elements (while the ID
condition would not require that a > c).16
As is well known, increasing differences is equivalent for smooth functions to
non-negative cross partial derivatives. Often, however, a will not be differentiate
everywhere, even if it is derived from a smooth production function. If a is C2 and
Condition PT is satisfied, then Conditions S is also satisfied. Indeed, it can be
shown that PT together with a smooth implies that the cross partial derivatives
are nonnegative, which is equivalent to ID. And ID implies Condition S:
Proposition 2.13. Let T be a subset ofWL. If a satisfies ID, the economy is
segregated.
Proof. Take a = c and b = d and a > b in the definition of ID. Increasing
differences implies that —a (a, b) > a (6, a) since a (a, a) = a (6, b) — 0. However,
a (a,b) — a (6, a) implies that a (a,b) — 0. Hence, the individuals might as well
segregate. •
As an application of the foregoing discussion, note that the surplus functions
in Kremer [10] satisfy increasing differences and result in segregation. As we show
below, Kremer-Maskin's [12] model only satisfies Condition PT and does not have
segregation. In [12] the surplus function a is not differentiate on the diagonal
while in [10] it is.
Thus, the surplus function may provide more information about the proper-
ties of the equilibrium match than the production function. For instance, there
are cases in which production functions are neither super- nor submodular and
yet from the surplus computation it is easy to see that the economy must be
segregated.17
Moreover, innocuous-looking restrictions on production functions may be un-
desirably strong in the context of matching models. For instance if the type
16
 Another way to see this is to note that ID implies that
o (a, c) — o (a, d) > a (6, c) — a (b, d) and a (a, b) — o (a, d) > a (c, b) — a (c, d)
whenever a > b > c > d. In the multi-dimensional case, PT and ID are not comparable:
condition PT requires the comparison of types that ID does not and vice-versa.
17For instance, let T = [4,5] and /(a, b) = A(y/a+ \/b) — emax{a36, 63a}, where 0 < e < ^ Q -
It is straightforward to verify that fa and /& are positive wherever they exist (which is everywhere
except on the diagonal). And fai < 0 almost everywhere; hence / is not supermodular (neither
is it submodular, although this takes slightly more effort to show). But since /(a, b) — | [/(a, a) +
/(6, b)] oc a4 + 64 — 2 max{a36, b3a} < 0 on T2, a(a, b) = 0, and the economy is segregated.
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space is one-dimensional, it is natural to suppose that the production function is
symmetric. If it is also supermodular, then heterogeneous matches are ruled out:
Proposition 2.14. Let the production function h : M2 —* WL be symmetric:
h(a, b) = h(b, a). If h is supermodular the economy is segregated.
Proof. If h(a, b) = h(b, a) is supermodular, it satisfies the inequality h(x V y) +
h[x A y) > h{x) + h(y); putting x = (a,b) and y = (6, a) then implies that
h(a, b) — \[h(a, a) -\- h(b, b)] < 0; hence a(a, b) = 0 and the economy is segregated.
•
Thus, at least for one-dimensional type spaces, if one is to have (nontrivial)
heterogeneous matching, one must rule out (symmetric) supermodular production
functions, or else introduce imperfections.
Finally, if we index economies by a parameter 9 representing some aspect of
the production technology or some degree of market imperfection, and do com-
parative statics on the characteristic function, we will find that u(') and V(*)
change differently for different types. For instance, if 6 measures a degree of capi-
tal market imperfection, increases in 9 will typically lower the segregation payoffs
of poor agents but may have no effect on those of wealthy ones; at the same time,
the production possibilities for mixed coalitions, if one partner is wealthy enough,
may also be unaffected. Thus for low 6 we could have segregation, while for high
9 we would have heterogeneous matching: Conditions S (or P) will be satisfied
at some parameter values, while for others it will not. The consequence is that
the equilibrium matching pattern for a fixed type distribution will vary across
economies and that in some cases the type distribution will play an important
role in determining the outcome while in others it will not.18 We will return to
this point in the next section.
3. Applications
We now apply the above theory to the analysis of some recent models. First,
we return to the models discussed above, reconcile the differences in their com-
parative static behaviors and obtain some further results with the apparatus we
18
 Notice that in certain cases, changes in the underlying parameters will not change the
equilibrium matching. For instance, for a given distribution of types, if the underlying parameter
6 representing technology or imperfections changes the surplus functions in a linear way, i.e.,
a (a, 6; 9) = Ao (a, 6; 9'} , where A > 0 the equilibrium matching will be the same with 9 and 9'.
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have developed. The next two examples consider economies with imperfections.
In both cases the production technology satisfies increasing differences so that
the first best version of these economies will display segregation. The first ex-
ample considers a financial market imperfection which results in the violation of
Condition S. We show that the matching configuration will be sensitive to the
distribution of types and that in some instances the effects of the imperfections
swamp the effects of the production technology. The second example considers
production with an incentive problem. There it turns out that Condition S is still
satisfied but that segregated matching may be inefficient.
3.1. Perfect-Markets Examples
We return to the models we discussed above. We will generally be interested in
looking at the behavior of a set of models parameterized by a single scalar 9. In
the present case this will be a technological parameter. As the parameter changes,
both the utility possibilities for each pair of types and the segregation payoffs for
each type change. As will see, the interaction of these two effects will affect the
equilibrium matching pattern.
Let the type space be an interval [a, a], a > 0, and h(a,b) = max {a66, beaj
(so [10] corresponds to 9 = 1 and [12] to 9 = 2). Since these are transferable utility
models, we will use the surplus function cr(a, b) = max |0 , max {a6^, bda} — ^{ae+1 + be+1)}
to study these economies.
A quick calculation reveals that Condition PT is satisfied for all 9 > 1 (in
fact, for all 9 > 0), so that the economy will always be positively matched. As we
mentioned before, a somewhat longer calculation shows that a satisfies ID if and
only if 9 = 1. Thus the economy is segregated when 9 = 1.
For 9 > 1, the analysis is somewhat more complicated. We do know from
Proposition 2.8 that there will be heterogeneous matches for some type assign-
ments, and since Condition PT is satisfied, these must be positive assortative.
It is useful to graph the surplus for a fixed type a as a function of a potential
partner's type b < a. This is done in Figure 5a for different values of 9.
Figure 5
It is easy to show that the type M (a) < a that maximizes the total surplus
<j (a, b) is first decreasing in 9 and then increasing in 9 (and tends to a as 9 tends
to oo). We can also show that a (a, b) is concave in b < a when a > 0 and that
for a 6 (M (a), a ) , the graphs of the surplus functions a (a, fr)6<a and a (d, b)b<d
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intersect at b < M (a) (we can think of this as a "single crossing to the left"
property). Furthermore, M (a) is decreasing in a. This suggests that for 9 close to
one, increases in 9 will decrease segregation while for larger values of 9 segregation
will increase. So in general we should expect a change in matching pattern when
9 changes.
There is however a case where the matching is invariant to local changes in
9. The condition under which this happens is similar to the condition that yields
invariance in Becker's model. Since M (a) is decreasing in a, if M (a) < a, then
for any a, M (a) < a. Because of the single crossing to the left, it follows that any
c < b < a < a, the gains from trade are greater in a match with c than in a match
with b for both a and a. We call this property "unanimous monotone ranking" and
we show in the appendix that as long as the surplus function satisfies PT and has
this property, the matching always takes the form of the highest type matching
with the median type and the other types matching in a positive assortative way
while respecting the measure consistency condition. Note that in Becker's model,
the surpluses also have this property.
Definition 3.1. There is unanimous monotone ranking (UMR) on [a, a] if for
each a £ [a, a] the surplus function a (a,-) is decreasing on [a, a] .
When UMR is satisfied and the type distribution is atomless, the equilibrium
matching pattern has a simple characterization in which the highest type matches
with the median type, and all other match in such a way as to keep the "probability
distance" between a type and his partner constant at 1/2.
Proposition 3.2. Suppose that there is UMR on [a, a] , that a satisfies PT, and
that the assignment map r generates a continuous distribution of types T(a). Then
there exists an essentially unique equilibrium matching in which for a 6 [am,a],
T{a) — T(ra(a)) = | , where ra(a) is a's partner and am is the median type.
Proof. Appendix. •
Observe that if we hold 9 fixed and instead change the distribution of types
by "lengthening" the support, an economy can change from satisfying UMR to
violating it. The matching pattern will then change from the one described in
Proposition 3.2 to one in which some types are more nearly segregated (see Figure
5b). This kind of result is obtained in [12].
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3.2. Imperfect-Markets Examples
These examples are based loosely on [13]. The first introduces a financing con-
straint. The most dramatic change is the differential effect of the imperfection on
the segregation payoffs of different types. Put simply, wealthy agents get the same
segregation payoff with or without the financing constraint. Poor agents suffer a
large decrease in the segregation payoff with sufficiently imperfect financing. The
result is possibly a significant change in the matching pattern (as well as in the
aggregate output of the economy). The same kind of effect was present in the case
of the technological changes studied in the previous subsection, although here the
outcome varies more dramatically with the type distribution.
The second example introduces a moral hazard problem into the production
process. This reduces the segregation payoff for all types, but again those of the
lowest ability are most severely affected. But a second effect now comes into play,
which is not present in perfect-markets examples: increasing information costs
also reduce the transfer ability of utility. The moral hazard problem requires
that payoffs exceed a positive lower bound for each partner. It turns out that
this change in the characteristic function offsets the changes in the segregation
payoffs in such a way as to keep the matching pattern unchanged. But now aggre-
gate performance will no longer be optimal, even conditional on the information
constraints: total surplus could be increased by forcing matches to differ from
their equilibrium form. The source of the failure of optimality of equilibrium is
the restricted transferability introduced by the incentive problem, on which we
comment below.
3.2.1. Production with an Imperfect Financial Market
Consider now a modification of the standard production model in which a fixed
amount k > 0 of capital is required for production to take place; once this
is invested, output depends on the ability of the firm's members according to
h(a, b) — ab. The cost of a unit of capital is normalized to one. The sum of
wealth and output may divided among the individuals in any way. Individuals'
types are now two dimensional: they are described by their ability a E [a, a] and
their initial wealth w £ [0,w], w < k. These have some joint distribution G(a,w).
Suppose that production is efficient for all ability levels in the economy, i.e. that
h(a,a) > k. Any two individuals my form a firm, possibly pooling their resources
(wealth) to purchase capital and then produce as in the examples above (there
are no incentive problems, however).
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We now consider the family of economies indexed by the parameter 6 E [0,1].
This will represent the degree of imperfection in the capital market. Individuals
with wealth levels w and w' will have to satisfy the constraint w -\-w' > 6k. Thus
the case 6 = 0 corresponds to a perfect capital market since initial wealth places
no constraint on what a firm can do; the case 6 = 1 represents the case in which
the financial market is absent altogether: firms must be entirely self-financed.19




We note first that if 6 = 0, the economy will be segregated by ability, since it
essentially is the one studied in [10] (The wealth levels of matching partners is
indeterminate, however.) This outcome is independent of the initial distribution
of types. For now, assume that this distribution is uniform on [a, a] x [0, w] and
that 6 > 0. This will create a positive measure of agents (those with wealth less
than Y) whose segregation payoff becomes 0. The surplus of a pair agents of types
(w,a) and (w',a') is
., \ i i iw f aa'— k — (u((w.a))+u((w'a'))) \iw-{-w'>








 \ 0, if w + w' <
We claim that for any value of 6, the equilibrium match will entail segregation by
ability. Below we construct an equilibrium and we prove in the Appendix that
this equilibrium is essentially unique. The equilibrium payoffs and the way wealth
levels are matched depend on the value of 6. If 6 > 0 is small enough that 6k < w,
then for each a, v (a) = 9L-J^- independently of wealth. Intuitively, there is an
excess supply of agents with wealth greater than ^ a n ( i these agents will bid the
payoff to the agents with zero segregation payoff to its maximum. Since there
is an excess supply of rich agents, there are many ways to match wealth levels.
However, it is clear that two agents of different ability cannot improve on their
equilibrium payoff: they each get the segregation payoff of the economy without
imperfection, and we know that this economy is segregated.
19This kind of capital market imperfection can derived by supposing that the agents, upon
having to repay, may renege on their debt and escape a nonmonetary punishment of size Pk
(P > l)with probability TT. Lenders will make loans of size k only to those firms with aggregate
wealth greater than 9k = (1 — (1 — 7r)P)k; 9 = 0 corresponds to n = (P — 1)/P; with larger
values of TT escape becomes more likely, until with TT = 1, the market shuts down altogether
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If instead 6 is large enough that 6k > w, then, agents with wealth less than
6k — w cannot find a match for which the total wealth is 6k\ the matching is
therefore between agents of wealth greater than 6k—IB : those with wealth between
this amount and y have a zero segregation payoff while those with wealth greater
than y have a positive segregation payoff. There is a family of equilibrium payoffs:
let c (w) be a decreasing (possibly weakly) function of w with c (6k — w)< y^—
and c ( y ) = 0, then the payoff to a type t = (w, a) is v (t) = 9L^L + c (6k — w) if
w > Y a n d i s v (t) = ^y^ - c (6k - w) if w < ™- When w < 6k, there is negative
matching in wealth; for a given ability level, the richest agents match with the
poorest agents. Since v' (a) = a for each a, segregation by ability is indeed the
equilibrium situation.
So, depending on the value of 6, the division of the surplus is different, but
the equilibrium matching pattern is always segregation by ability and some form
of negative matching by wealth level. The fact that the equilibrium match in
abilities is the same as in the first best situation is however an artifact of the
uniform distribution. To see that for other distributions different patterns of
matching happen, consider the following examples.
Figures 6a and 6b
Figure 6a depicts a situation with four atoms ti = (wi:ai). We assume that
di — as = a and a<i = a± = 6, a > 6, Wi > y , i = 1,2 and Wi < ^ * = 3,4,
W\ + u>4 > 6k, W2 + Ws > 6k but w^ + w^ < 6k. Note that t<i cannot match with
ti and generate a positive surplus and that u (ti) = 0 for i = 3,4. ti will benefit
from a match with £3 as long as ab — k — v (t3) > ^-y^; hence t2 is willing to
bid the payoff to £3 up to ab — ^ -y^. t\ can match with either £3 or £4; he will
prefer a match with £4 if ab — k — v (£4) > max f ^ -y^, a2 — k — v (t^)) . Suppose
that the masses on the four atoms are equal, that a — b is not too large and that
k is not too large. Then, the unique equilibrium involves matches (^1,^ 4) and
(^2,^3); for instance, v (£3) = ab — ^ -y^, v (£4) = 0 are payoffs consistent with
this matching and the previous conditions as long as a,b,k are chosen such that
k < 4ab — 2a2 — b2. Observe that in this example we cannot really say whether the
partners are matched positively or negatively by ability; but if we had perturbed
the abilities slightly so that a\ > a% and a± < a<t, the same coalitions would form
in equilibrium and the matching would be negative in both ability and wealth.
Figure 6b depicts a situation in which all the probability is put on a diagonal
of [0, w] x [a, a] in a uniform way. By feasibility, the poorest agents need to match
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with the richest agents; since the poorest agents happen to have the highest
ability, this match maximizes the gains from trade for these two types. Note
that if the richest agents form a match with other types of agents, they would
face competition from other agents and would necessarily end up with a lower
surplus. Hence, the unique equilibrium matching is the one in which types (t,t')
match when wt + wt> = 6k that is to say there is negative matching in wealth
and in ability levels. This shows that, at least in some examples, the wealth
effects induced by the financial market imperfections overwhelm the forces toward
segregation generated by the production function.
Moreover, note that in both examples of Figure 6, redistribution of wealth
would increase the surplus. For instance, if we give t3 the wealth of £4 and vice
versa, the equilibrium match will be now be (£1,^ 3) and (£2^4) a n d the total
surplus is a2-\-b2 — 2k while it is initially 2ab—2k. Note however that this increased
in surplus must decrease the equilibrium payoff of some type since we know that
equilibria are constrained Pareto optimal. Note for instance that in the original
equilibrium v(t\) + v(tz) > a2 — fc, so a Pareto improving redistribution would
entail that they were receiving wealth as compensation rather than transferring
it to the ti's. (Constrained Pareto optimality is partly an artifact of our restriction
to environments in which there are no externalities across coalitions of size two.
In more general environments, of course, Pareto improvements may be possible).
The observation that matching can be inefficient has already been made in the
literature (e.g., [2], [6], [7], [13]). In some cases policy measures may be tailored
specifically to correcting the match itself rather than designed to do so indirectly
via redistribution of initial wealth (see [5] on this point). The next example is
another illustration of this possibility.
3.2.2. Production with an incentive problem
A somewhat different sort of inefficiency can arise in matching environments when
there are restrictions on transferability within coalitions. Consider the same pro-
duction function as before, but now suppose that there is a moral hazard problem:
each partner in a match must take some effort in order for output to be produced.
The effort levels are low and high, with cost 1 if the high effort is chosen and zero
otherwise. In order for partners of ability a and b to produce ab, both must take
the high effort. Effort can be monitored at a cost: if c(6, q) is invested at the time
of the match, the probability of detecting a partner if he takes the low effort is q
(this probability is independent across partners, but the same q must be chosen
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for each partner). We assume that c(0,g) = 0, that c(-,-) is increasing in both
arguments and convex in q.
Each partner receives a contract which specifies that he receives a payment y
if he is not caught taking low effort and 0 if he is.20 Given the level of monitoring
q, incentive compatibility then requires that y — 1 > (1 — q)y, or y > - . The
net output generated by a firm with partners a and b and monitoring q is then
ab — c(9,q); but even though the partners are assumed to be risk neutral they
cannot transfer this output to each other arbitrarily: each partner must receive
at least - .
For analyzing this problem it is convenient to consider the maximum payoff
that an agent can achieve assuming his partner is incentive compatible, considered
as a function of q. This expression, h — c(#,g) 1, with 9 > 0, is graphed
for different values of h in Figure 7. Also shown is the incentive compatibility
constraint 1: if h = ab, both a and b must get a payoffs at least this high if
they are to be incentive compatible.
Figure 7
For 9 = 0, q is optimally set equal to 1. In this case, the first-best alloca-
tion with segregation is achieved in equilibrium (We assume it is efficient for all
partnerships to produce: if abilities lie in the interval [a, a], then a > y/2.)
Things can be rather different, however, if 9 > 0. Let q (h) be the lower value
of q, when it exists, at which the graph of h — c(9, q) 1 intersects the graph
q
of - — 1. When q(a2) exists (and lies in [0,1]), the segregation payoff of type
a is *-y^ —u- — 1. Clearly, there exists a unique h° such that the graphs of
h — c(9: q) 1 and - — 1 are tangent. Hence, when a < yhP, q (a2) does not
exist and the agents have a zero segregation payoff.21
20If one takes the assumption of two partners literally, this is not likely the optimal contract,
since the firm's output would typically serve as a signal of the partner's effort. We have in mind
situations, such as those in large firms, where output information reveals little about individual
effort and other (costly) signals must be employed instead. See [13] for a more general analysis.
21
 If c(6,1) is finite, the set of types with zero segregation payoffs may be larger than [a,
This hardly affects the analysis, however; when it does, we shall point this out.
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Because the choice of q varies with a (when a > yhP) and because the segre-
gation payoff will be zero for some types, we might conjecture that there would
be gains from trade, and therefore heterogeneous matches in equilibrium, as there
were in the examples with imperfect credit markets. However, this is not possible.
Indeed, we have
Proposition 3.3. The economy with moral hazard is segregated for all 0.
Proof. Suppose instead that there is a heterogeneous match (a,b), with a > b.
Let q be the level of monitoring they choose. Clearly, a has a positive segregation
payoff (if not, then neither does 6, and nothing can be gained if they match), and
q > q(a2). Let ya and ?/& be the levels of compensation paid to each of the partners.
If b has a positive segregation payoff and q > q(b2), then since for a heterogeneous
match to occur we must have
, ,„ w a2-c(0,q(a2)) b2 - c (0, q (b2))
ya + yb = ab-c(e,q)> y ^ ~ i Z + 2 >
we immediately conclude, since c(0, •) is increasing in g, that
a contradiction.
If instead q < q(b2) or 6 has a zero segregation payoff (q(b2) does not exist),
then b2 — c (0, q) — - < -; heterogeneous matching again requires that
ab-c (9, q)-yb>
and, since y^ > -,
b*-c(e,q)
adding these two expressions and rearranging yields
a contradiction. We conclude that no heterogeneous matches can occur. •
Figure 8 shows the feasible sets for three possible coalitions and the segre-
gation payoff vector for the mixed coalition, which clearly lies outside of (the
comprehensive extension of) its feasible set.
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Figure 8
Even though the matching configuration is unchanged when incentive problems
are introduced, there is an important difference between the two cases from a
welfare point of view: when 0 is large enough, the equilibrium will not always
be efficient in the sense of maximizing total output net of monitoring and effort
costs. The reason is that some types are "left out" of the economy, and more
output could be generated if higher types were forced to match with them.
To see this, suppose that c (0, q) — 9q and 0 > 2. Consider two atoms, one at
a > y/hP and one at b < y/hP with equal masses.22 Simple computations show that
y/nP = (80)1/4 and that the segregation payoffs — which are also the equilibrium
payoffs — are u (a) = a ^ ~sd — 1 and u (ft) = 0.
Suppose now that a planner forced the a's and ft's to match (she might also
have to dictate how they share surplus). If they share the surplus equally, they
will choose q (ab) = ab ^e ~8& anc^ the total payoff in the equal-share aft-firm
is equal to ab+ya^b ~w — 2 (note that this is the maximum payoff that such a
firm can generate). Therefore the aggregate payoff is \ I ab+vaW-88 _ 2 J . In the
segregated economy, since there were only half as many active firms, the aggregate
payoff was | ( ° + 2 ~8° ~~ ^) • Total surplus under this forced match will be higher
than under the equilibrium match whenever
2aft + 2Va2ft2 - 80 > a2 + Va4 - 80 + 4. (3.1)
Let b = 8 (80)* and let a = §(§)i, where 0 < 8 < 1. Clearly a > y/hP > ft, and
aft = (90)2 . Expression (3.1) becomes,
Ve
As 8 approaches 1, the left hand side converges to approximately 3.36V0,
which since 0 > 2, exceeds 4.75. Hence, for 8 close enough to 1 and /or 0 large
enough, there can be an increase in the aggregate payoff when a and b are forced
to match.
22
 Because of the linearity assumption, c(9, q) is finite at q = 1 and the the set of types who
have zero segregation payoffs is actually larger than [a, y/hP] when 9 is small enough. Specifically,
the highest type with a zero segregation payoff is \/2 + 9 when 9 < 2; for 9 > 2, it is \/ho.
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The reason that surplus maximizing matches are not achieved in equilibrium
stems from the limited transferability introduced by incentive problems. An a who
is forced to match with a b receives less than his segregation payoff and cannot be
compensated by the b because that would entail that the b end up with less than
an incentive compatible compensation. This would violate feasibility. Thus this
simple example illustrates how a conflict between "cake production" (maximizing
the surplus generated by matches) and "cake division" (maximizing one's share
of a given surplus) can lead to distortions in the pattern of matching.
4. Conclusion
We provide a characterization of equilibria in two person matching environments.
We argue that a measure of the gains from trade from a match, which we have
called surplus, is a useful concept for understanding this class of models. We
believe that this concept will be valuable for analyzing more general matching
models. For the purpose of comparative statics, a great deal of insight is obtained
from the fact that both the segregation payoffs and the feasible set vary differ-
entially across environments for agents of different characteristics. It seems that
future progress in understanding comparative statics in matching models of the
type we have considered here will depend on sharper characterization of the com-
parative static properties of these two quantities. Our examples with imperfect
markets illustrate quite clearly that the properties of the production technology
are especially insufficient in making welfare evaluations on the basis of an observed
matching pattern or in predicting the outcome of the match.
5. Appendix
5.1. A Note on Comprehensiveness
Comprehensiveness is a relatively mild condition to impose when the economy
has no imperfections. In the presence of incentive and/or contractibility prob-
lems, however, description of the feasible set will often entail that each agent
receives a nonnegligible payoff, so comprehensiveness will be violated (see Figure
8 for an example). None of our results depend on comprehensiveness (except in
instances where it is already guaranteed by other assumptions), although exis-
tence of an equilibrium might. Existence of the segregation payoff is facilitated
by comprehensiveness, although in extreme cases in which the Pareto frontier does
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not intersect the diagonal, the segregation payoff can be found by convexification
(this has an appealing interpretation: the segregation payoff represents what an
agent could expect to get by matching with a partner of his own type).
For existence, the following construction suffices. Define the comprehensive
extension of a set V(-) as the smallest comprehensive set containing V(-). The
economy in which V is replaced by its comprehensive extension will have a non-
empty core. Moreover, there will always exist core allocations in the extended
economy in which agents receive utility levels that are on the Pareto frontier
of the original feasible set V(-). Such allocations satisfy feasibility, minimality,
measure consistency, and the no blocking requirements of an equilibrium of the
original economy, and so the original economy has an equilibrium.
When Condition S is satisfied and V is comprehensive, then the segregation
payoff vector lies outside (or on the Pareto frontier) of V(-). Violations of this
condition entail that the segregation payoff vector lies in the interior of V(-). But
if V is not comprehensive, then segregation payoff vector may lie outside of V(-)
and still entail a violation of Condition S.
5.2. Proof of the Necessity of Condition PT
We continue here the proof of Proposition 2.12. We need only show that Condition
P implies Condition PT. To do so, we will show that Condition P is violated when
Condition PT is violated. If Condition PT does not hold, there exists {a, 6, c, d} C
T1, where aVdybVc^bAcyaAd such that
V{h t2} = {b,c} ^ ^
If b = c, (5.1) can be rewritten as a(a,d) > cr(a,b) + a(b,d). In this case,
let s (a) = cr (a, b) + e, s (d) = a (a,d) — a (a, b) — e, with e > 0, s (b) = 0. In an
economy with three atoms of equal mass at a, b,d, the matching {a,d} , {6} and
the payoff s constitute an equilibrium. Indeed, if {a, 6} forms, the most that a can
obtain is a (a, b) which is less than s (a). If d and b match, the most that d can
obtain is a (b, d) which is less than 5 (d) as long as e < cr (a, d) — a (a, b) — a (6, d).
Therefore, if a violates the triangle inequality, Condition P is also violated. Hence
we must have23
a (a, b) 4- a (6, d) > cr (a, d)
a (a, c) + <T (c, d) > a (a, d)
23
 Clearly, 6V c^b ^b Ac and bVc^c^bAc.
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Note that we cannot apply this argument to show that a (6, c) + a (c, d) >
a (6, d) since it is not known that 6 V d >- c >- b Ad.
Suppose now that the triangle inequalities (5.2) are satisfied but that Condi-
tion PT is violated. We show that there exists a payoff s G Sp (a,d) x Sp (b,c),
such that the following holds
s (a) + s (b) > a (a, b)
s(a) + s(c) >tr(a,c)
 ( ,
s(d) + s (b) > a {d, b) l ° ' ° ;
s (d) + s (c) > a (d, c)
Note that since s G Sp (a,d) x Sp (b, c), (5.3) can be rewritten as
a (a, b) — s(b) < s (a) < a(a,d) + a (b, c) — a (d, c) — s (b) (5.4)
a (a, c) — a (6, c) + s (b) < s (a) < a(a,d) - a (d, b) + s (b) (5.5)
The bounds are consistent by (5.1). Note that by the triangle inequality, a (a, d) —
a (d, b) < a (a, 6), hence that the upper bound in (5.5) is equal to the lower bound
in (5.4) when the payoff to b is equal to s* = | [a (a, b) + a (d, b) — a (a, d)]. By
(5.2), s* > 0. Let £ be a small positive number and let s (b) = s* + e. Clearly,
s (b) > 0 since s* > 0.
We show that a (b, c) + a (c, d) > a (6, d) (recall the discussion after (5.2)). By
(5.2), a(c,d) > a(a,d) — a(a,c), therefore, a(b, c)+a (c,d) > a (b,c) + a(a,d) —
a (a, c). Since PT is violated, a (6, c) + a (a, d) — a (a, c) > a (6, d) which proves
tnat
a(b,c) + a(c,d) >a(b,d). (5.6)
Since PT is violated,
a (a, d) + a (b, c) > a (a, b) + a (c, d) (5.7)
Hence, after adding (5.6) and (5.7), we obtain a(a,d) + 2<r(6, c) > a(a,b) +
a(b,d) which proves that s* < (j(b,c) and therefore that s (b) < a (fr, c) for
£ G (0,a(b,c) - s*).
The result follows if we show that there exists a feasible payoff to a satisfying
a (a, b) — s (b) < s (a) < a(a,d) - a (d, b) + s (b). Note that a (a, d) — a (d, b) <
a(a,d) (trivially) and that a(ayd) — a(d,b) + a(b,c) > 0 by (5.1). Therefore
there exists e' small enough and s(b) G (0,<J(6, c)) such that by taking s (a) =
a (a, d) — a (d, b) + s (b) — e', (5.4) and (5.5) are satisfied.
This shows that there exists s G Sp (a, d) x Sp (6, c) satisfying (5.3) and there-
fore that Condition P is violated. Hence, Condition PT is equivalent to Condition
P. •
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5.3. Proof of Proposition 3.2
Since UMR holds, the surplus a (a, a') is decreasing in a', if a' < a and is increasing
in a', if a' > a. We prove the result by a series of claims.
1. The equilibrium surplus is increasing in a. Suppose not. Let a match with
b and without loss of generality assume that b < a. Let d > a and suppose
that s (a) > s (a) (where s(a) = v(a) — u(a)). Since s (a) + s (b) = a (a, b),
UMR implies that a (d, b) > a (a, b) hence that a (d, b) — s(b) > s (a) > s (d).
This is a contradiction since d and b could deviate.
2. Each a matches with at most one type smaller than itself. Suppose instead
there are two such types b and c, with c < b < a. Then a (a, b) — s (6) =
a (a, c) — s (c). By UMR, a (a, b) < a (a, c). Hence, s (b) < s (c) which
contradicts the first result. Therefore, a matches with at most one other
ability level b < a. This proves the existence of a matching map m as in the
Proposition.
3. Suppose that m(a) < am. By positive matching, types in [om,a] match
with types less than ra (a). But this violates measure consistency, since the
measure of types less than m (a) is less than | , while the measure of [am, a]
is 2-
4. Suppose that m (a) > am; let a\ = m (a). Measure consistency then implies
that there is 6 > 0 such that for a > a\, m(a) — a > 6. Thus, there exists
0"m < a2 < a\ with m(a2) > a. Now, since ((i2->m(a2)) is an equilibrium
match,
s(a2) = a(a2,m(a2)) - s (m(a2)) > (r(a2ja) — s (a)
By UMR, a (a2,m(a2)) < a (a2,a). Therefore, s (m(a2)) < s (a). This con-
tradicts the fact that the equilibrium surplus is increasing in ability.
5. Hence, m(a) = am. Consider any a E (a m , a ) . If T{a) — T{a) ^ T (am) —
T(m(a)), we obtain a contradiction by replicating the arguments in 3 or 4.
5.4. Proof that there is segregation by ability in the example of section
3.2.1
Crucial to the proof of segregation is the fact that the payoff function is increasing
in wealth and in ability.
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Lemma 5.1. (w, a) > (w', a') => v ((w, a)) > v ((u/, a'))
Suppose instead that v((w:a)) < v((w',a')). Since v((w,a)) > 0, it must
be that when (w, a) is a match of (w', a'), w + w' > Ok. Therefore, v ((w, a)) +
v (((it), d))) < da — k and w + w > 9k. But then, it is possible for the coalition
{a, a} to deviate. A first consequence of Lemma 5.1 is that the payoff function
v (•, •) is differentiable almost everywhere.
A second consequence of lemma 5.1 is that an agent (if, a) prefers (weakly) to
be matched with an agent of ability {6k — w,a') rather than an agent of ability
(w', a') : wealth levels greater than 9k —w only reduce the residual payoff to (w, a)
but do not increase the total surplus.
Lemma 5.2. There is no loss of generality in supposing that whenever an agent
of type (w,a) is not segregated, he matches with an agent of wealth 9k — w.
A second fact crucial for obtaining the result is that "agents of the same
wealth" are positively matched in ability levels.
Lemma 5.3. Let (w, a) and (w, a') be two types that have same wealth compo-
nent but different ability levels a > a'. If(w,a) matches with (u>, d), then (w,af)
must match with (w', d') where a! > a.
Proof. Let w' be such that w' + w > 9k. We show that argmaxb ab — v ((w', b))
is increasing in a (in the strong set order). Let b (a) be an element of the set of
maximizers. By a revealed preference argument, for any a and d,
ab (a) - v ((«/, b (a))) > ab (a) - v ( « b (a))) , ,
ab (a) - v ((ti/, b (a))) > ab (a) - v ( « b (a))) [ }
hence, subtracting one inequality from the other, we obtain,
(a — a)b (a) > (a — d) b (a)
If a > d, it follows that b (a) > b (d). The result now follows from Lemma
5.2. A consequence of Lemma 5.3 is that if B (w, a) denotes the set of types who
prefer to match with (it;, a), that whenever a > a', inf B (it;, a) > sup B (it?, a ') . •
Finally, we establish that v ((w, a)) is continuous in a.
Lemma 5.4. For a fixed it;, v ((if, a)) is continuous in a.
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Proof. When w < 6k — w, the equilibrium payoff of types (to, a) is equal to
zero, which is obviously continuous in a. Assume that w > 6 k — w and that there
exists a such that lim£|o (v (('W-,a + £)) — v ((w,a ~ £))) = <5 > 0. By Lemma 5.1
, and v > 0, lim£|o'i; ((w, a + z)) > 0. Hence, each type (w, a + e) matches with
some type (w (e) ,b(e)) and generate a positive surplus. Now, for each £ > 0,
(w (e) ,b(e)) must prefer to match with (w, a + e) rather than with (w, a), i.e.,
b (e) (a + E) — v ((w, a + E)) > b (E) a — v ((w, a)).
This implies that 6(e) > | , which is impossible for £ small enough since
b (E) < a. •
5.4.1. Case 1 : w > 6k
Note that the feasible matches for agents with zero wealth are with those agents
with wealth greater than 6k. From Lemma 5.2, agents with wealth greater than
6k prefer weakly to match with agents with zero wealth.
For a fixed type (0, a ) , the types (w, a) who prefer to match with (0, a) satisfy:




Let B (0,a) be this set. If a is a point of differentiability of v ((0, •)) and if
a € (a, a) ,(5.9) is equivalent to a = Vi ((0,a)) (take the limit of the right hand
sides of the inequalities as b —> a). In particular, if a > v2 ((0, a)) , B (0, a) = 0
while if a < v2 ((0, a)) < a, B (0, a) = {(w, v2 ((0, a))) : w > 6k} .
If for all a, B (0, a) = 0, types (0, a) have an equilibrium payoff of zero. But
then, B (0,a) = [^ fc,iU] x [a,~a] which contradicts the assumption that B (0, a) = 0.
Consider a for which B (0, a) ^ 0. Consider a small neighborhood TV around
(0, a) ; we can choose this neighborhood such that the Lebesgue measure of N is m.
By continuity of v, it follows that the Lebesgue measure of the set UO'GAT ^  (0> a')
is greater than m X (w — 6k). This contradicts measure consistency unless each
type in B (0, a) is indifferent between matching with (0, a) and matching with
himself, i.e., unless v ((0,a)) is the segregation payoff ^y^. But this implies that
5(0,a) = [0k,w] x {a}.
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From the differentiability and continuity of v, it follows that for all a, v ((0, a)) =
i
. Since v ((w, a)) is increasing in w, it follows that for all (w, a), v ((w, a)) =
^. The matching in wealth is as in the text.
5.4.2. Case 2: w < 6k.
In this case, agents with wealth less than 9k — w cannot find a match with gains of
trade. Let w — 0k — w and note that agents with types (w, a) can feasibly match
with types (w, b) only. The reasoning of Case 1 can be applied here, but we need
to show directly that v<i ((w, a)) = a. (Observe that since v ((0, a)) is continuous
in a and has an increasing derivative, v ((w, a)) is a convex function of a.)
Note that by Lemma 5.3, if {w,a) matches with (w_, a), where a > a, types in
{w} x [a, a) do not match and have a payoff of zero. Because v is convex, measure
consistency implies in turn that there exists a* < a such that a* = v<i ((0,a))24
(where v<i denotes here the left derivative). But then, B{w_,~a) = {w} X [a*, a].
Taking a small neighborhood around (w_, a) , we obtain a contradiction like in Case
1. Hence, (w,a) matches with (w,a) • This is possible only if v2 ((0, a)) = a for
almost all a. Suppose now that (w_, a) matches with (it;, d) , where a > a. By the
same argument as above, measure consistency and convexity of v imply that types
in {w} x (d, a] do not match. But then, these types have a zero payoff and this is
a contradiction since, in particular, (w, a) would then prefer to match with (w., &)
than (w_, a + a — a). Hence, (w, a) matches with (w, a). Measure consistency and
continuity of v imply segregation by ability. The payoff structure in the text is
possible but, in general, we cannot ensure that the equilibrium payoff is continuous
in w (we know however that it is differentiate in w almost everywhere).
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PAM is satisfied if
(2,2) A (1,1) = (1,1)
is the vector order
(b)
(2.1) v (1,2) = (2,1) ( 2 , 1 ) A ( U ) =
(2.2) v (1,1) = (2,2) ( 2 , 2 ) A ( U ) =
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